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Abstract 
The United States’ position in, and conduct of, the negotiations leading to the Paris 
Agreement, as with almost all international diplomacy leading to reciprocal 
international undertakings conducted by that country, reflected not only internal 
politics, but also the constraints of domestic law. The United States is not unique in this 
respect, but it is unusual in the extent to, and manner in, which its municipal law 
constrains the creation of international commitments. This article disaggregates US 
international and domestic climate policy as it developed prior to the Paris negotiations 
and analyses how those dynamics played out on the multilateral stage, influencing the 
shape of the Paris Outcome even to the  name of the instrument. Among the subjects 
analysed are (1) the extent of the Executive’s powers in foreign relations on climate and 
related issues; (2) the strengths and limitations of existing federal legislation as 
domestic legal authority for an international agreement on limiting emissions of 
climate-disrupting gases; (3) domestic implementation of the US INDC; (4) executive 
agreements as vehicles for undertaking internationally legally binding commitments on 
climate; and (5) the role of the courts.1 
[page 153] 1. Introduction 
The Paris negotiations were brought to a standstill in their last moments by what was 
diplomatically identified as a typographical error in the President’s final text. As 
documented by multiple news accounts,2 the US delegation held up final adoption of the 
Paris Agreement, insisting on the hortatory ‘should’ as opposed to the obligatory ‘shall’ 
1 This article was supported by a generous grant from the Dr. Thomas F. Carney ‘47 Gift Fund and is 
based in part on the author’s publication ‘The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A 
Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?’, 39(2) Harvard Environmental Law 
Review 515 (2015). The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments and advice from Lucas 
Bergkamp, Sherry Xin Chen, Sonja Marrett, and Nigel Purvis. The responsibility for all views expressed 
in this article is nonetheless the author’s own. 
2 See, e.g., Melissa Eddy, ‘At Climate Talks, a Few Letters That Almost Sank the Deal‘, New York Times, 
16 December 2015, <www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/at-
climate-talks-three-letters-almost-sunk-the-deal>; Amitabh Sinha, ‘Paris Talks: Shall/should; The World 
Between a Wrong Word’, Indian Express, 14 December 2015, 
<http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/paris-talks-climate-change-shallshould-the-world-
between-a-wrong-word/>; and John Vidal, ‘How a “typo” nearly derailed the Paris climate deal’, The 
Guardian, 16 December 2015, <www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/dec/16/how-a-typo-
nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal>. See generally, Daniel Bodansky, ‘Reflections on the Paris 
Conference’, Opinio Juris, 15 December 2015, <http://opiniojuris.org/2015/12/15/reflections-on-the-
paris-conference/>. 
2 
in article 4(4).3 This is arguably the most critical undertaking in the Agreement for 
industrialized states such as the United States, codifying the expectation that developed 
countries will ‘continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute 
emission reduction targets’. 
To the casual observer, this episode might have seemed just an inconsequential quibble 
with little broader significance. Correctly understood, it is anything but. US Secretary of 
State John Kerry proclaimed as much, vigorously asserting that, absent this change, the 
United States would refuse to become party to the instrument.4 The clash over article 
4(4) had been prefigured prior to the opening of COP 21, when President François 
Hollande had initiated a debate with Secretary Kerry over the legal form of the Paris 
Outcome, and in particular whether it would be a ‘treaty’.5 These two exchanges, which 
bookended the conference proper, are both emblematic of the challenges encountered 
by the [page 154]  United States not just in the UN-sponsored climate negotiations, but 
also in many other areas of US foreign policy, particularly those involving 
implementation through domestic regulatory initiatives. 
Although the United States’ reengagement with the multilateral climate negotiations 
and its negotiating strategy have been much praised for shielding the outcome from 
domestic political and legal attack,6 the apparent preference for non-binding over 
binding formats comes at a potentially high price in the form of the durability of the US 
expressions of intent on the international level. Using the exchanges over the word 
‘treaty’ and the US last-minute insistence on ‘should’ over ‘shall’ as examples, this 
article first reviews the history of the UN-sponsored climate negotiations, with an 
emphasis on the participation of the United States. Then domestic implementation of 
international climate-related commitments is examined, an analysis that includes the 
roles of the Executive Branch, the Senate, the full Congress, and the courts. 
Following that, the piece scrutinizes the crucial legal doctrine concerning the ‘executive 
agreement,’ an instrument of potentially great utility as a vehicle for the United States to 
make internationally legally binding economy-wide emission-reduction commitments 
without the participation of the Congress or the Senate. In performing this assessment, 
3 Compare UN Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (12 December 2015) (President’s final draft of Paris 
Agreement and accompanying decision as initially presented), 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf> with U.N. Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 
(12 December 2015) (final as adopted), <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf>.  
4 Eddy, supra note 2 (quoting Kerry as saying ‘I said: “We cannot do this and we will not do this. And 
either it changes, or President Obama and the United States will not be able to support this agreement.”’). 
5 E.g., Michael Stothard and Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘Hollande Rejects Kerry’s Comments on Paris Climate 
Accord’, Financial Times, 12 November 2015, <www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5ab680d4-8965-11e5-9f8c-
a8d619fa707c.html#axzz3yAP8WwU2>; Demetri Sevastopulo and Pillita Clark, ‘Paris Climate Deal will 
not be a Legally Binding Treaty’, Financial Times, 11 November 2015 (quoting Kerry as saying 
‘December’s climate change talks will not deliver a “treaty” that legally requires countries to cut their 
carbon emissions’), <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/79daf872-8894-11e5-90de-
f44762bf9896.html#axzz3yAP8WwU2>. 
6 E.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘How US Negotiators Ensured Landmark Paris Climate Deal was 
Republican-Proof’, The Guardian, 13 December 2015, <www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/dec/13/climate-change-paris-deal-cop21-obama-administration-congress-republicans-
environment>. 
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the article seeks to elucidate the unseen dynamics behind not only the Paris 
negotiations, but any number of other multilateral efforts. As a consequence of this 
assessment, guidance emerges in distinguishing negotiating positions of the Executive 
Branch that are legally necessary from those that are policy-driven. 
 
2. The International Legal Architecture 
 
There is no question about the Paris Agreement’s legal force under international law. 
After entry into force, the Agreement will be a legally binding treaty within the meaning 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.7 The Agreement’s provisions on 
signature, ratification, and entry into force8 remove any doubt about the intent of the 
parties to the Agreement to be bound under, and [page 155]  hence governed by, 
international law. Viewed within the regime established by the Framework Convention, 
however, the legal form of the Paris Agreement displays a number of curious attributes. 
 
2.1. The Copenhagen Negotiations and the Durban Platform 
 
The possibilities for a ‘legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
Convention applicable to all Parties,’ mandated by COP 179 and subsequently described 
by the neutral term ‘Paris Outcome’ during the negotiations leading to COP 21, are 
quite clearly identified in the text of the Convention. The most obvious is a new 
protocol, which would be applicable to all Convention parties including the United 
States. An additional amendment to the Kyoto Protocol beyond the Doha Amendment10 
might technically meet this test, but would be fraught with procedural and political 
difficulties, especially given the United States’ rejection of Kyoto. The identification of 
a third commitment period under Kyoto would likely have encountered similar 
analytical and political difficulties. Another option for a legally binding instrument 
applicable to all parties could conceivably have been an amendment to the Convention 
itself, expressly anticipated by article 15. 
 
The United States signalled its discomfort with these choices, by electing the answer, in 
effect, ‘none of the above.’ The form of next multilateral climate agreement, as 
indicated in part by the name of the instrument, was discussed as far back as the year 
before COP 15 in Copenhagen, which laid the foundation for the broad contours of the 
Paris Outcome. Since then governments had widely understood that the next agreement 
could not be called a ‘protocol’ without complicating US participation.11 The US 
submission to the pre-Copenhagen process uses the unexpected (from the perspective of 
 
7 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, para. 1 (“Treaty” means an international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a 
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.’) 
(hereinafter Vienna Convention).  
8 Paris Agreement, arts. 20 and 21, 12 December 2015 (hereinafter Paris Agreement). Cf. Vienna 
Convention, supra note 7, arts. 11-16. 
9 Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, para. 2, Dec. 
1/CP.17, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 at 2 (15 March 2012). 
10 Doha Amendment, Dec. 1/CMP.8, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1 at 2 (29 February 2013) 
(adopting Doha Amendment) (hereinafter Doha Amendment). 
11 Personal communication from Nigel Purvis, President and CEO, Climate Advisers (28 January 2016). 
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the Convention and the Protocol) term ‘implementing agreement’.12 The US submission 
prior to COP 20 in Lima in 2014 referred specifically to the ‘Paris Agreement’.13  
[page 156] 
 
2.2. The Paris Negotiations 
 
Early on in the implementation of the ‘bottom-up’ approach based on individual 
national submissions of INDCs leading to the Paris Agreement, the United States made 
clear its expectation that the Paris Outcome would be a mixture of both legally binding 
commitments and non-binding political statements of intent not governed by 
international law. It also elaborated with considerable specificity the dividing line 
between the two. 
 
For instance, in a speech at Yale University more than a year before COP 21, Todd 
Stern, United States Special Envoy on Climate Change, made the following 
observations: 
 
The Durban mandate says, in effect, that the new agreement will be a legally binding one 
in at least some respects, but doesn’t specify which ones ... [T]here would be a legally 
binding obligation to submit a ‘schedule’ for reducing emissions, plus various legally 
binding provisions for accounting, reporting, review, periodic updating of the schedules, 
etc. But the content of the schedule itself would not be legally binding at an international 
level.14 
 
 
12 US Submission on Copenhagen Agreed Outcome (2009), <http://perma.cc/3PP5-RHAP>. Cf. 
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3 (modifying multilateral convention through procedure 
other than specified in parent agreement).  In the end, there was no binding instrument adopted at COP 
15, so the issue of its legal form and relationship to the Convention’s structure did not arise at the 
multilateral level. 
13 See US Submission – September 2014 (US submission to U.N. climate negotiations before the 20th 
session of the Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change in Lima, 
December 2014), <http://perma.cc/NH7U-NX7H>. Cf. Lima Call for Climate Action, Dec. 1/CP.20, U.N. 
Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1 (containing ‘elements for a draft negotiating text’ without specifying 
title or form of instrument), <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/cop20/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2>. 
14 Todd D. Stern, Special Envoy for Climate Change, US Dep’t of State, ‘Seizing the Opportunity for 
Progress on Climate (discussing legal form of Paris agreement) (emphasis supplied) (14 October 2014), 
<http://perma .cc/65TG-NXSV>. 
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The United States’ position going into Paris was consistent with this perspective.15 The 
text of the US INDC16 does not identify the legal force of its [page 157]  economy-wide 
target, i.e. emissions cuts of 26-28 per cent measured against 2005 levels by 2025. By 
contrast, the INDCs of the EU17 and Norway18 expressly identified their economy-wide 
emission-reduction goals as internationally legally binding. 
 
The name of the resulting instrument, the Paris Agreement, is consistent with the ‘none 
of the above’ options seemingly preferred by the United States as to legal form. The 
Agreement and its accompanying decision refer repeatedly to the Convention, as in 
establishing that the Convention COP will serve as the meeting of the parties under the 
agreement,19 that the Convention’s Secretariat will service both agreements,20 and that 
the Convention’s amendment procedures apply to the Paris Agreement as well.21 
 
Nonetheless, because the text of the Convention does not anticipate a freestanding 
agreement connected in a legal manner to the parent instrument, the Paris Agreement’s 
relationship to the Convention, unlike the Kyoto Protocol’s and Doha Amendment’s, is 
not entirely clear. More problematically, although the non-binding decision in which the 
Paris Agreement is embedded makes passing reference to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris 
Agreement proper makes not a single reference to that instrument. This is not just a 
curious attribute, but a potentially serious omission that could raise legal questions 
about continuity of the climate regime from the Protocol to the new Agreement. 
 
3. Domestic Legal Constraints and Opportunities in the Exercise of Executive 
Power 
 
Consistent with the British doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament from which the 
American legal system is derived, the United States is primarily a dualist system. The 
international and domestic legal orders do not intersect except through the operation of 
 
15 Testimony of Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd D. Stern, Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Subcommittee on Multilateral International Development, Multilateral Institutions, and International 
Economic, Energy, and Environmental Policy, 20 October 2015, 
<http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/102015_Stern_Testimony.pdf>; Letter from Julia 
Frifield, Assistant Secretary of State, Legislative Affairs, to Bob Corker, Chairman, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (19 October 2015) (‘The intended nationally determined contribution reflected in 
the U.S. “INDC” submission is not intended to constitute an obligation that the United States must fulfill 
under international law, and the United States considers that the Paris agreement should reflect that 
approach more broadly. Thus, we are not seeking an agreement in which parties take on legally binding 
emissions targets.’), <https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/State-Letter-to-
Chairman-Corker-Climate-Negotiations.pdf>; Submission – September 2014 (2014) (US submission to 
U.N. climate negotiations before the 20th session of the Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Lima, December 2014, referring to ‘Paris agreement’), 
<http://perma.cc/NH7U-NX7H>. 
16 US Cover Note, INDC, and Accompanying Information (31 March 2015) (hereinafter US INDC), 
<http://perma.cc/C92R-7ZTF>. 
17 Submission by Latvia and the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union and Its Member 
States (2015) (hereinafter EU INDC), <http://perma.cc/6ZX2-DM7T>. 
18 Submission by Norway to the ADP (2015), <http://perma.cc/Y8KC-WTZG>.  
19 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 16(1). 
20 Ibid., art. 17(1). 
21 Ibid., art 22. 
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some mechanism linking the two. Binding international agreements, whose parties are 
states, operate as the legal equivalent of a contract or compact in international law, 
thereby making law for the states parties to them. Treaties, subordinate to the 
Constitution, have binding effect on the domestic level as well, typically with the legal 
force of a statute.22 
 
[page 158] On domestic matters, the US Congress adopts binding, prospective 
legislation, implemented by the President as Chief Executive, who has a constitutionally 
based duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’.23 In the area of foreign 
relations, by contrast, the text and structure of the US Constitution embody a tension 
between the President’s power effectively to represent the United States as a unitary 
state in foreign relations and the essential need to preserve the rule of law at home.  
Moreover, the US doctrine of separation of powers, constitutionally entrenched and 
rigorously enforced by the Supreme Court, can produce a situation—as at present—in 
which both chambers of Congress are controlled by a political party different from that 
to which the President is affiliated. 
 
3.1. Treaties and Executive Agreements on Environment 
 
The implicit assumption, dating to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, has been 
that either Senate advice and consent to ratification, new legislation, or both are 
necessary before the United States can become party to a substantive agreement under 
the auspices of the Framework Convention that requires reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions. Whether or not that was the case in 1997, or in 2001 when President Bush 
announced his decision not to ratify Kyoto, or for that matter at COP 15 in 2009, it is a 
question that is worth re-examining in light of current circumstances. 
 
The text of the US Constitution requires the advice and consent of the Senate, by a two-
thirds majority, to the President’s ratification of concluded international agreements.24 
But the Executive Branch also enters into a distinct and much larger category of 
‘executive agreements’ on behalf of the United States that, unlike treaties concluded 
under article II, section 2 of the Constitution, do not require subsequent congressional 
endorsement.25
 
In contrast to [page 159]  a treaty in the constitutional sense, which has 
 
22 US Const. art. VI, § 2 (‘[A]ll treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land…’). See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); 
Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 101 (Tentative Draft No. 1 
2015) (hereinafter Restatement 4th); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States § 111(1987) (hereinafter Restatement 3d); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 
(New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2d ed.1996), at 54. 
23 Ibid., art. III, § 3. 
24 US Const. art. II, § 2. See generally, David A. Wirth, ‘The International and Domestic Law of Climate 
Change: A Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?’, 39(2) Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 515, at 543 n.166 (2015) (describing structural and institutional mechanics 
and legal effect of Senate advice and consent process).  
25 From 1939 through 2013 the United States concluded about 17,300 executive agreements, by contrast 
with approximately 1,100 treaties in the constitutional sense. Michael John Garcia, ‘International Law 
and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law’ (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report 
no. RL32528, 18 February 2015), at 5, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf>. 
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the same legal force as a statute,26 the domestic legal effect of an executive agreement 
which is not expressly authorized by statute or treaty and is concluded without 
congressional participation can be more difficult to discern. But under international law, 
it is clear that executive agreements have the same binding force as treaties;27 the 
distinction is a purely domestic one peculiar to the United States and largely unknown 
to other legal systems. 
  
In the case of an article II, section 2 treaty, the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent 
to ratification provides the necessary legal authority not only for the agreement to bind 
the United States under international law, but also for it to operate as domestic law. 
With respect to an executive agreement, however, the legal authority for its domestic 
implementation must be found elsewhere in US domestic law. An executive agreement, 
like every other act of the President, must be supported by domestic legal authority. An 
executive agreement has come to be understood as requiring legal authority in the form 
of one or more of the following: (1) Congressional legislation; (2) an article II, section 2 
treaty; or (3) the President’s own constitutional powers.28 
 
In the environmental field, characterized by a complex web of legislative mandates, the 
most likely, although not necessarily the only, authority for an executive agreement is a 
statutory enactment. Although some executive agreements may be concluded based on 
express statutory authorizations or instruction, neither is necessary as a condition 
precedent to the legality of an executive agreement. Rather, the Executive may conclude 
an international agreement without Senate advice and consent so long as the agreement 
can be implemented relying on existing statutory authority. Any number of binding 
international agreements on environmental matters, including major multilateral 
conventions such as the recent Minamata Convention on Mercury29 adopted in 2013, 
have been concluded as executive agreements by the United States.30  [page 160] 
 
3.2. Executive Agreements in the Courts 
 
The Executive Branch’s conclusion of executive agreements dates to the early years of 
the Republic31 and has routinely withstood legal challenges in the courts.32 But 
international agreements generally, and executive agreements in particular, also present 
unusual challenges to assuring Executive Branch adherence to the rule of law through 
judicial review. 
 
26 US Const. art. VI. See also Whitney v. Robertson, supra note 22. 
27 For the sake of precision, the remainder of this article uses the generic term ‘international agreement’ to 
identify all instruments binding on the United States under international law. The term ‘treaty’ is limited 
to those international agreements for which the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification is necessary or 
has been given under US Constitution Article II, Section 2.  
28 See Restatement 3d, supra note 22, § 303; Henkin, supra note 22, at 215–26. 
29 Minamata Convention, 10 October 2013 (hereinafter Minamata Convention) (not in force). 
<http://perma.cc/9F8J-44W3>. The Supreme Court set aside major rules on mercury emissions from 
power plants, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015), without apparent controversy over US capacity 
to implement the Convention. 
30 See Wirth, supra note 24, at 552-57 (2015) (collecting binding international agreements done as 
executive agreements by United States). 
31 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003). 
32 See Wirth, supra note 24, at 546-51. 
  8 
 
Channels for testing the legality of an international agreement are essential to assure 
that the President remains a creature of law, and that his or her authority to conclude a 
pact with foreign powers is not an occasion for an aggrandizement of power beyond the 
constraints of the domestic rule of law. Judicial review of any international agreement, 
whether an article II, section 2 treaty or an executive agreement concluded without 
Senate advice and consent, occurs only post hoc, after the agreement is already in place 
as a matter of international law and binding rights and obligations for the United States 
and the foreign treaty partners have already been created. 
 
Even if a court were to conclude that an international agreement lacks domestic 
authority, that agreement would remain in force internationally, having already been 
concluded with foreign powers and having created international law among them to 
which the United States will be bound regardless of the court’s holding. 33 The legal 
integrity and subsequent validity of an executive agreement consequently benefits from 
finely tuned Executive Branch determination of the existence—or absence—of legal 
authority before the instrument is concluded, and care to recognize those international 
agreements that might exceed existing legal authority. 
 
To facilitate assurances within the Executive Branch of the existence ex ante of 
adequate domestic legal authority, the US State Department has adopted a [page 161]  
procedure known as ‘Circular 175’.34 Pursuant to that process, the negotiation and 
conclusion of virtually all international agreements require the prior approval of the 
Secretary of State or his or her designee.35 The request for State Department approval is 
accompanied by a memorandum of law setting out the constitutional and statutory 
authority supporting the proposed agreement and identifies additional laws or 
regulations that may be necessary for the agreement’s domestic implementation.36 The 
process provides for Congressional consultation in appropriate situations.37 
 
 
33 See Wirth, supra note 24, at 548-50 (discussing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 US 
221 (1986)). Concern about binding future Presidents, as opposed to the United States as a state, is a 
distinct concept. Most modern multilateral agreements, including article 25 of the Framework Convention 
and article 27 of the Kyoto Protocol, contain denunciation or withdrawal clauses that permit a state to 
terminate its obligations under the instrument. Canada did precisely that with respect to the Kyoto 
Protocol. Cf. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Hon. Ron Wyden (D-
Ore.) (6 March 2012) (identifying denunciation of an executive agreement as an international legal 
remedy for subsequent changes in domestic law or policy), <http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/84365507-State-Department-Response-to-Wyden-on-ACTA.pdf>. 
34 21 C.F.R. § 181.4; 11 US Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 720; see also Circular 175 
Procedure, US Dep’t of State, <http://perma.cc/QHC2-WBBB>. Abandonment of a non-binding 
statement of intent most likely would not be judicially reviewable.  See notes 50 and 77 infra.  Cf. 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)(plurality holding that President’s termination of mutual defense 
treaty with Taiwan is non-justiciable political question). 
35 11 US Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 724.1 (‘Negotiations of treaties, or other ‘significant’ 
international agreements, or for their extension or revision, are not to be undertaken, nor any exploratory 
discussions undertaken with representatives of another government or international organization, until 
authorized in writing by the Secretary or an officer specifically authorized by the Secretary for that 
purpose.’). 
36 Ibid., at § 724.3(h)(3). 
37 See, e.g., ibid., at §§ 722(4), 723.4, 725.1(5). 
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Pursuant to a legislative requirement, the Case-Zablocki Act,38 the Executive is required 
to transmit executive agreements to Congress. The State Department is also responsible 
for making legal determinations as to the binding nature of international agreements, 
which are then collated and published.39 
 
 
 
 
3.3. The Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol in the Senate 
 
The George H. W. Bush administration presented the Framework Convention to the 
Senate, seeking its advice and consent, which was given by division vote.40 Neither the 
President’s Letter of Transmittal41 nor the Secretary of State’s Letter of Submittal42 of 
the Convention to the Senate mentions the domestic procedure anticipated to be 
followed with respect to subsequent protocols to the UNFCCC. In response to 
subsequent written questions from the Foreign Relations Committee, the Executive 
Branch stated that, if a protocol containing targets and timetables ‘were negotiated and 
the United States [page 162] wished to become a party, we would expect such a 
protocol to be submitted to the Senate’.43 
 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the resolution of ratification 
for the UNFCCC, expressed the expectation that future actions that would require 
legally binding emission reductions would require the Senate’s advice and consent.44 
This is a preference expressed by a committee of the Senate, and was not included as a 
formal reservation to the resolution of advice and consent adopted by the full Senate, 
which has wide discretion to give or withhold its consent to ratification subject to 
binding conditions or reservations.45 Committee reports, while perhaps helpful in 
interpreting the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent, do not have the force of 
law.46 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated for the United States by the Clinton Administration, 
and the agreement owes much of its content to US government input. But even before 
the Protocol’s adoption, the Senate had expressed its objection to the agreement in a 
resolution sponsored by Senators Byrd and Hagel and adopted by a vote of 95-0,47 
referencing two factors: the Protocol’s failure to identify emissions reduction goals for 
 
38 1 U.S.C. § 112b. 
39 Treaties in Force, US Dep’t of State, <http://perma.cc/QJA5-RC3E>. 
40 138 Cong. Rec. 33527 (1992)(Senate resolution of advice and consent to Framework Convention). 
41 See S. Treaty Doc. 102-38, at III (102d Cong. 2d Sess. 1992) 
42 Ibid., at V. 
43 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations 106 (102 Cong 2d Sess. 1992) (S. Hrg. 102-970). More generally, the Executive noted that, 
‘given that a protocol could be adopted on any number of subjects, treatment of any given protocol would 
depend on its subject matter.’ Ibid., at 105. 
44 S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-55, at 14 (1992). 
45 See note 24 supra.  
46 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (actions taken by subsidiary 
bodies of the full Congress lack legal force). 
47 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
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non-Annex I countries; and anticipated ‘serious harm to the economy of the United 
States’. 
 
The Clinton Administration consequently had relatively little expectation of obtaining 
Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Protocol by the two-thirds majority 
required by article II, section 2 of the Constitution. Vice President Al Gore nonetheless 
signed the Kyoto Protocol in November 1998, toward the end of the Clinton presidency, 
presumably on the expectation that the composition of the Senate would shift in a 
direction more receptive to the agreement. In the end, the Protocol was never submitted 
to the Senate for its advice and consent. In March 2001, President George W. Bush 
announced that the United States would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.48 
 
Although the Byrd-Hagel resolution may be indicative of a generalized political 
sentiment in the Senate opposed to multilateral action on climate, it is [page 163] far 
from clear that that instrument would prevent the Executive from agreeing to binding 
emission reductions in the Paris Agreement. First, as a resolution of a single house of 
the Congress, the resolution lacks legal effect.49 Second, a principal purpose of the Paris 
Agreement is to overcome the ‘original sin’ of the Convention and Kyoto Protocol, 
which assigned substantive reduction obligations only to Annex I developed countries. 
The Paris Agreement consequently appears to satisfy that portion of the resolution 
concerning the inclusion of developing countries. 
 
Further, paragraph 2 of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, requesting ‘a detailed explanation of 
any legislation or regulatory actions that may be required to implement the protocol or 
other agreement’ applies only to a ‘protocol or other agreement which would require the 
advice and consent of the Senate to ratification’. The Executive Branch supplied such 
an analysis in its INDC.  In any event, to the extent that an agreement did not require 
Senate advice and consent—that is, could be legally concluded as an executive 
agreement—this provision would not apply. That inquiry—the need for Senate advice 
and consent to ratification of an instrument containing internationally legally binding 
economy-wide emission reductions—is the subject of the remainder of this article. 
 
3.4. Massachusetts v. EPA and subsequent Executive Branch Actions 
 
The legal and policy setting domestically within the United States is now entirely 
different from the late 1990s, at the time of Kyoto when the United States had done 
little to cut carbon emissions, and has dramatically changed even since the Copenhagen 
COP.50 From a structural point of view, the principal development has been President 
 
48 See Letter from President George W. Bush to Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) (13 March 2001). 
Ratification is a political act by the President pursuant to his plenary powers, and has never been 
subjected to judicial supervision. 
49 Chadha, supra note 46. 
50 The Copenhagen Accord, as an expressly non-binding statement of intent, is not a treaty in the 
Constitutional sense and consequently did not require submission to the Senate for its advice and consent. 
Similarly, nonbinding undertakings are not subject to judicial review. See generally, Duncan B. Hollis 
and Joshua J. Newcomer, ‘”Political” Commitments and the Constitution, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 507 (2009) 
(advocating legislative assertiveness in oversight of political commitments). 
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Obama’s deployment under existing domestic authority, included but not limited to the 
Clean Air Act, to effectuate emission reductions in the United States. 
 
Massachusetts v. EPA51 was a proceeding for judicial review of a petition to the US 
Environmental Protection Agency, requesting the Agency to regulate emissions of 
greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles under section 202 of the US Clean Air 
Act.52 Consistent with President Bush’s 2001 decision to [page 164] refrain from 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and to decline to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants, 
the EPA denied the petition in 2003.53 Twelve states, along with several municipalities 
and public-interest organizations, filed suit, challenging the denial. After they lost in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,54
 
the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court reversed by a 5-4 vote, 
rejecting the arguments relied on by the Court of Appeals. 
 
The Court concluded that the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases,55 and 
has a nondiscretionary duty to consider whether GHGs ‘cause, or contribute to, air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare’.56 
If the EPA were to make such a determination, it would then be under a mandatory duty 
to regulate emissions of GHGs from mobile sources—principally automobiles and 
trucks—under section 202 of the Act unless ‘it determines that greenhouse gases do not 
contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it 
cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do’.57 
 
The EPA has since promulgated several important regulations requiring improvements 
in vehicle fuel efficiency that will substantially reduce emissions from automobiles and 
light-duty trucks.58 In August 2015, the Agency adopted its Clean Power Plan, which 
will reduce emissions from electric power plants by thirty-two per cent over 2005 levels 
by 2030.59 The President also promulgated his comprehensive Climate Action Plan,60 
including both state-level and voluntary initiatives. Moreover, the United States has 
 
51 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 7521. 
53 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (8 September 
2003) (denial of petition for rulemaking).  
54 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
55 549 U.S. at 528–33. 
56 Ibid., at 533–35; see also 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(1). 
57 Massachusetts v. EPA, supra note 51, 549 U.S. at 533. 
58 See generally, Wirth, supra note 24, at 537-38. 
59 Environmental Protection Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015), codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60. See Fact Sheet: President Obama to Announce Historic Carbon Pollution Standards for Power Plants 
(3 Aug 2015), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/fact-sheet-president-obama-
announce-historic-carbon-pollution-standards>. 
60 Exec. Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action Plan (2013) (hereinafter Climate Action 
Plan), <http://perma.cc/2DTH-LL89>. See also The White House, President Obama’s Climate Action 
Plan: Progress Report (2014), <http://perma.cc/7AGC-HUL6>. 
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already reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by nine per cent compared to 2005 
levels.61 [page 165] 
 
The Clean Power Plan has been challenged in a proceeding for judicial review, and the 
Supreme Court has issued a stay of the rule in the judicial proceedings.62 Nonetheless, 
the EPA’s previous greenhouse gas regulations have fared well in the Supreme Court, 
which has so far tended to look favourably on its statutory authority to regulate power 
plants, in particular. In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,63 the Court 
concluded that the Clean Air Act generally, and section 111 in particular,64 which is the 
statutory authority for the Clean Power Plan, displaces the federal common law of 
nuisance. 
 
In reaching that conclusion, the Court opined that ‘the [Clean Air] Act “speaks directly” 
to emissions of carbon dioxide from defendants’ [power] plants’.65 Subsequently, in 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,66 the Court reaffirmed that ‘The authorization to 
which we referred was that given in [section 111 of the Clean Air Act], a part of the Act 
not at issue here and one that no party in American Electric Power argued was ill suited 
to accommodating greenhouse gases’.67 Consequently, even if portions of the specific 
regulatory structure of the Clean Power Plan are set aside, there is still every reason to 
believe that the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases from power plants.68 
 
The legal authority for each of these actions, as well as additional legislative 
authorization, is enumerated in the US INDC. The Executive Branch has not released its 
analysis underlying the quantitative economy-wide reductions identified in the INDC, 
and there is some disagreement about whether they can be met. The World Resources 
Institute nonetheless has found that existing domestic authority is already sufficient to 
reach the 26-28 per cent target.69 That goal is attainable through an amalgam of federal 
programs already in place (such as vehicle fuel-efficiency standards and the power-plant 
rules), proposals awaiting finalization (such as controls on methane [page 166]  
emissions from oil and gas operations), state-level actions either underway or actively 
contemplated, and existing federal legal authority that has yet to be tapped. 
 
 
61 The US INDC references EPA’s 1990-2013 Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report, see 
<http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html#about>, which documents a 
nine per cent reduction in 2013 by reference to 2005. The INDC itself states that ‘[t]he United States has 
already undertaken substantial policy to reduce its emissions, taking the necessary steps to place us on a 
path to achieve the 2020 target of reducing emissions in the range of 17 percent below the 2005 level in 
2020,’ a pledge dating from 2009. 
62 West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773, 84 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016). 
63 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
64 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
65 American Electric Power, supra note 63, 131 S. Ct. at 2537. 
66 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
67 Ibid., at 2441 n.5. 
68 In an analogous manner, the Supreme Court set aside major rules on mercury emissions from power 
plants because of the manner in which the statutory mandate was implemented, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. 
Ct. 2699 (2015), without creating apparent controversy over US capacity to implement the Minamata 
Convention, supra note 29. 
69 Karl Hausker, et al., ‘Delivering on the U.S. Climate Commitment: A 10-Point Plan Toward a Low-
Carbon Future’ (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute Working Paper June 2015), 
<http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/WRI15_WorkingPaper_post-2020_0.pdf>. 
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4. The Paris Agreement as an Executive Agreement 
 
This complicated web of legal considerations and political factors readily explains both 
the last-minute fiasco precipitated by the United States over article 4(4) of the Paris 
Agreement and the perhaps more significant motivation to refrain from offering an 
INDC with binding, economy-wide emission-reduction targets. 
 
4.1. Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement 
 
While there appears to be no publicly available document setting out behind the US 
delegation’s serious concerns over the precise wording of article 4 (4) of the Paris 
Agreement, even a cursory glance at the text of that provision with a knowledgeable eye 
explains the underlying dynamics at play.  As proposed by the President of the Paris 
COP in his final draft, the text read as follows: ‘Developed country Parties shall 
continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction 
targets.’ After resolution of the disputed language, the mandatory ‘shall’ was replaced 
by the hortatory ‘should.’ 
 
The text directly addresses the hot-button issue of quantified economy-wide emission 
reductions of the Kyoto variety that had proven so politically controversial in the United 
States. From a legal point of view, such commitments can be difficult to implement 
using existing domestic legal authority. The US INDC in effect aggregates sector-
specific interventions expressly authorized by federal legislation in such areas as vehicle 
fuel efficiency and power plant emissions. There is no obvious legal authority for 
implementing a particular quantified Kyoto-style reduction target across all sectors, 
some of which may fall within the reserved powers of subnational units, such as the 
several states.   
 
Lacking specific federal legislation creating such authority, the  Executive Branch in its 
INDC had undertaken something of a ‘work around’, relying instead on the authority of 
sector-focused existing legislation.  Further reductions beyond the targets stated in the 
US INDC available through the exercise of that authority could be limited, especially to 
the extent that the United States’ numerical contribution to the Paris Outcome 
represents something approaching the maximum effort available through the 
deployment of existing [page 167]  authority.70 A binding, forward-looking promise that 
the United States will ‘continue’ to take the lead, in this interpretation, might lack 
present domestic legal authority. 
 
There is some—and perhaps considerable—room to argue whether this is an 
excessively cautious legal interpretation of the first sentence of article 4(4) of the Paris 
Agreement. At least as interpreted by the United States, ‘economy-wide absolute 
emission reduction targets’ are not necessarily internationally legally binding. 
Moreover, ‘undertake’ in English, the language in which the precise phrasing was 
 
70 The extent to which the US contribution is achievable is, not surprisingly, subject to some debate. 
Compare Hausker, et al., supra note 68, with C2ES, ‘Achieving the United States Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution’ (Arlington, Virginia: June 2015) (identifying ‘remaining gap that needs to be 
filled’ beyond existing authority), <http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/achieving-us-indc.pdf>. 
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contested, has an ambiguous meaning in this context71 and does not necessarily indicate 
an intention to be bound. In any event, there is no prohibition on the United States’ 
agreeing in an executive agreement to enter into a subsequent binding commitment.72 
 
 
 
4.2. An Executive Agreement with Binding Emission-Reduction Obligations 
 
The more interesting question, susceptible of analogous analytical treatment, is the 
extent to which the US INDC submitted in advance of the Paris negotiations could have 
been concluded as an internationally legally binding commitment instead of as a non-
binding, aspirational statement of political purpose. 
 
The Paris Agreement, as discussed above, relies for its domestic implementation in the 
United States on existing legal authority. These include the ‘procedural’ requirements 
for data collection and exchange, periodic reporting, technology transfer, and scientific 
cooperation already included in the Convention, which received Senate advice and 
consent to ratification in 1992.73 The President arguably has the capacity independently 
to perform all [page 168]  these functions both as Chief Executive and in carrying out 
the foreign affairs function.74 Indeed, Secretary Kerry impliedly relied on exactly this 
theory in stating on the day of the Paris Agreement’s conclusion that ‘this [agreement] 
doesn’t need to be approved by the Congress because it doesn’t have mandatory targets 
for reduction, and it doesn’t have an enforcement-compliance mechanism’.75 
 
This statement clearly implies that an international agreement—presumably an 
executive agreement—containing mandatory targets would require Senate submission, a 
question which is eminently susceptible of legal analysis. As described above, the Paris 
Agreement was consciously structured to avoid the fraught term ‘protocol’, with all its 
domestic legal and political baggage in the United States. Hence, there is no a priori 
necessity to think that the instrument would need to be submitted to the US Senate for 
its advice and consent to ratification. 
 
The architecture of the Paris Agreement was also expressly constructed by all 
participating states to assure full participation by developing countries, thus satisfying 
the requirements of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which is not binding in domestic law in 
any event. Most importantly, the economy-wide emission-reduction targets identified in 
the US INDC rest on an independent statutory foundation that does not require 
 
71 See Merriam Webster Online Dictionary and Thesaurus, <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/undertake> (defining ‘undertake’ as meaning ‘to begin or attempt (something); to 
agree or promise to do (something)’).  
72 Cf. Memorandum of Intent Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Canada Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, U.S.-Can., 5 August 1980, 32 U.S.T. 
2521 (agreeing ‘to develop a [subsequent] bilateral agreement…[and] to facilitate the conclusion of such 
an agreement as soon as possible.’) 
73 See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra. 
74 See text accompanying note 23 supra. 
75 Interview with Chris Wallace, Fox News (12 December 2015), transcript 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/12/250595.htm>.  
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Congressional approval in the form of Senate advice and consent to ratification or 
otherwise. 
 
These questions are not mere semantic hair-splitting, but have practical, real-world 
consequences. The United States under the Obama Administration has engaged in many 
multilateral efforts from a domestic legal point of view as non-binding statements of 
purpose.76 These include not just the economy-wide emission-reduction targets in the 
UN-sponsored climate negotiations, but also the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 
nuclear issues with Iran.77 The reason usually given is to protect a presumably intricate, 
delicately balanced multilateral deal from unilateral meddling by what is assumed to be 
a recalcitrant Senate.78 [page 169] 
 
This strategy comes with a potentially high price: the explicit option of summary 
abandonment or relaxation of the United States’ economy-wide target after the end of 
the Obama Presidency. The US INDC purports to state the intention of the United 
States to reduce its emissions through 2025. As a matter of both domestic and 
international law, however, that is only a non-binding statement of political purpose by 
an Administration that will leave office in January 2017. A new President, perhaps of a 
different political party, need only say ‘I changed my mind’ to negate the internationally 
non-binding assurances made to the other parties to the Paris negotiations, nearly 200 in 
number -- and in a manner entirely consistent with international law. 
 
Part of the calculation may well have been that, by refraining from exacerbating 
relations with a recalcitrant Congress, the President would be better positioned to obtain 
authorization for the funding goals of the Paris Agreement in return.79 If so, that 
strategy seems to have backfired, as proposed resolutions introduced in the Congress 
expressly tie funding to submission of the Paris Agreement to the Senate for its advice 
and consent to ratification.80 
 
Under the Paris Agreement as adopted all NDCS have the same international legal 
character and are not binding as to result. There is consequently no distinction among 
NDCs in international law, including that of the EU originally offered as a binding 
 
76 See David Kaye, ‘Stealth Multilateralism: U.S. Foreign Policy Without Treaties—or the Senate,’ 92(5) 
Foreign Affairs, at 113 (September-October 2013).  
77 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Jul. 14, 2015), 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf>. 
78 Undertakings that are not binding under international law are not ‘treaties’ within the meaning of 
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution and hence have not been subject to Senate advice and consent. 
See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, ‘Executive Agreements and the (Non)treaty Power’, 77(1) North Carolina 
Journal of Law 133, at 188 (1998). Similarly, nonbinding undertakings are not subject to judicial review. 
Cf. generally Duncan B. Hollis and Joshua J. Newcomer, supra note 50.  
79 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 9; Dec. -/CP.21, supra note 3, paras. 54and115 (identifying 
collective funding goal from developed countries of US$100 billion per year).  
80 E.g., H. Con. Res .97, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (2015) (draft resolution expressing the sense of Congress 
that ‘the President should submit to the Senate for advice and consent the climate change agreement 
proposed for adoption at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-21), and Congress should refuse to consider any 
budget resolutions and appropriations language that include funding for the Green Climate Fund until 
COP-21 emissions commitments are submitted to the Senate.’); S. Con. Res. 25, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2015)(same); S. Res. 329, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (2015). 
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commitment. The United States and other countries adopting similar positions 
consequently prevailed on this issue of legal form, but as applied to the US one cannot 
help but question at what cost in terms of the longevity of that pledge. President Obama 
has repeatedly stated that he intends to use his executive authority to its maximum 
extent, presumably so as to cement his legacy as a leader on climate change as in other 
fields.  But in practice the precise contours of actions taken by his Administration on his 
behalf may well have been tempered by an excess of caution, unnecessarily accepting 
the allure of an apparently cost-free Senate-proof strategy at the price of long-term 
durability. 
 
